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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Shift in Policy

These divergent actions exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and ending wars—though how this aligns with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson echoed this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This pivot is major, but experts warn it is early to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Strains

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Targeted Action

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Observers see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.